Federalist 41 looks, from the title, to be kind of a catch-all, general examination by Madison of the Constitution and its perceived defects.
Generally, he says, one of the problems the drafters considered was whether it was necessary to grant a given power to the federal government and, if so, whether that grant of power had too great a potential for abuse to be allowed. The first power he addresses is the federal government's war-making power. Clearly, he says, it is necessary that the feds be able to declare war and peace, and to raise the armies and fleets that will fight these wars. "But was it necessary," he asks, "to give an indefinite power of raising troops, as well as providing fleets; and of maintaining both in peace, as well as in war?"
Generally, he says, one of the problems the drafters considered was whether it was necessary to grant a given power to the federal government and, if so, whether that grant of power had too great a potential for abuse to be allowed. The first power he addresses is the federal government's war-making power. Clearly, he says, it is necessary that the feds be able to declare war and peace, and to raise the armies and fleets that will fight these wars. "But was it necessary," he asks, "to give an indefinite power of raising troops, as well as providing fleets; and of maintaining both in peace, as well as in war?"
This liberty-versus-security question has been raised before, but here the arguments echo, to my ears, the arguments of our own time about our war against Islamic terrorists. The problem, according to Madison and hawks in our own day, is that while we might disband our armies in peacetime as a threat to liberty, we are unable to force our enemies to do the same. As long as they stay armed and hostile to us, we must be prepared to repel them. Si vis pacem, para bellum, in essence.
For this reason, an army and above all a navy must, Madison says, be maintained to protect these shores from foreign aggression. The Congress, he believes, as it is required to renew the military appropriations every two years, will be enough of a check on an ambitious military to avoid the fate of Rome and continental Europe.
Is it so? Many on the left would say that Congress will always be too fearful to reduce the military's spending. But fearful of whom? It is not a military coup d'état they fear; it is the reaction of the voters. Is this not democracy at work? If a Congressman thought the people of his district would support cutting military funds, surely he would do it. That they would not must suggest that by continuing to fund the wars he opposes, he is enacting the people's will. Thus, the Madisonian concept continues to work today.
